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THE NEED FOR JUDICIAL REFORM
Tom C. Clark*
Mr. Justice Holmes once said that "one may criticize even what one
reveres." 1 With this caveat I shall proceed to offer some critical comments concerning the Washington judicial structure, its proliferation,
its inefficiencies of operation and its methods of selecting and disciplining judges. I am well aware of Mr. Justice Brewer's observation
that "many criticisms may be, like their authors, devoid of good
taste."'2 However, I shall endeavor to escape this categorization, remembering instead that "better all sorts of criticism than no criticism
at all. ' 3 Indeed, it is "open season" on the courts these days. As Mr.
Justice Story reminds us, critics find it much "easier to point out defects than to devise remedies; to touch blemishes than to extract them;
to demolish an edifice than to erect a convenient substitute." 4 It is my
sincere purpose to be constructive, drawing my conclusions from my
service in both the appellate and trial courts of the federal system and
a quarter of a century of close contact with the courts of many states.
At the outset let me stress that my reverence for the courts and for the
judges knows no boundaries. In my view, both have made great progress under the most difficult circumstances. Indeed, in Washington the
effort to modernize goes back almost half a century to the creation of
the Washington Judicial Council. Since that time the Council has
sparked many improvements, such as the integration of the Bar, the
adoption of the federal rules of procedure, the establishment of the
Office of Court Administrator and the creation of an intermediate
court of appeals. 5 It is submitted, however, that the Council has not
faced up to some of the basic needs of the state's judicial system. As a
consequence, like most of its sister states, Washington still has an anti-
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Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 473 (1897).
Brewer, Government by Injunction, 15 NAT'L CORP. REP. 848, 849 (1898).
3. Id.
4. J. STORY, MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS 447 (1835).
5. See Finley, The Bare Bones of Court Reform, 13 ST. Louis U.L.J. 171 (1968), for
a more detailed coverage of the activity of the Council.
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quated judicial structure, an unmanageable court system, an ineffectual judicial selection method and a hollow disciplinary procedure.
I.. THE NECESSARY ELEMENTS OF A GOOD COURT
SYSTEM
Over two-thirds of a century ago Dean Roscoe Pound laid down
the general standards necessary for a good court system. 6 They were
unification, flexibility, conservation of judge power, and responsibility. By unification Pound meant a single system with a central authority. The system must have someone in charge, preferably the chief
justice, a supreme court with rule-making power over the entire judiciary, an intermediate appellate court to handle nonconstitutional appeals and a trial court of general jurisdiction with necessary divisions
for specialized litigation. By flexibility the Dean meant that the system
should permit judges or cases to be assigned where necessary in order
to attain a balanced case load. In advocating conservation of judge
power, Pound foresaw the use of court administrators and para-judges
to handle nonjudicial functions necessary to decision making such as
clerical and administrative work. Responsibility, the good Dean's
word for integrity, diligence, efficiency and sobriety, requires continual training of both the judges andthe staff.
II.

THE WASHINGTON COURT STRUCTURE

The Washington Supreme Court has nine judges, one of whom
serves by designation of the court as chief justice for a two-year term.
The justices are all elected on a nonpartisan ballot for a term of six
years and receive an annual salary of $33,000.7 Neither the court nor
the chief justice has any managerial control over the judicial system.
There is a court administrator, but his power and duties are limited to
the collection of statistical and other information on court dockets.
There is also a Judicial Council, but it has no managerial authority
either.

6.

Pound, The Causes of PopularDissatisfactionwith the Administrationof Justice,

20J. AM. JuI. Soc'y 178 (1936).
7. WASH. REV. CODE § 2.04.090 (Supp. 1972).
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The supreme court, the Administrator and the Judicial Council also
have no fiscal control over the system. There is no central budget.
While supreme court and court of appeals appropriations are included
in the budget of the Administrator, the other courts are financed by the
counties, with the superior court judges receiving fifty percent of their
salaries from the state. The operations of the courts of limited
jurisdiction (district, justice of the peace and municipal courts)
are all financed from fines, fees, bail forfeitures and the like collected by them in both civil and criminal filings. This means of
financing court operations may run counter to two decisions of
the Supreme Court of the United States, Tumey v. Ohio8 and Ward
v. Village of Monroeville.9 Although Tumey was decided in 1927 and
Monroeville in 1972, both overturned minor criminal convictions
before city courts on the ground that the magistrate was not a disinterested judicial officer. It is difficult to distinguish the court in Monroeville from Washington's courts of limited jurisdiction. In Tumey the
Supreme Court found that paying the judge's salary from fees offered
"possible temptation to the average man as a judge to forget the
burden of proof. . . or . . .lead him not to hold the balance nice,
clear and true between the State and the accused."' 0
The superior court, the only trial court of record in Washington,
has unlimited jurisdiction and has ninety-two judges presently sitting
in twenty-seven districts." Elected on a nonpartisan ballot for four
years, 12 the judges may sit in any district but only on invitation of the
local superior court judge or by order of the governor or chief justice. 13
4
The salary of the judge is $27,000, half of which is paid by the state.'
The clerks of the court are selected by the county clerk, who is elected.
Washington has sixty-two district courts of limited jurisdiction with
114 judges. There are also three types of municipal courts, including
justices of the peace. Towns of less than 5,000 population have a
part-time justice who is paid entirely from fees collected by the court.
This is, of course, in violation of Tumey, supra. In cities with popula-

8. 273 U.S. 510(1927).
9. 409 U.S. 57(1972).
10. 273 U.S. at 532.
11. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 2.08.061-.065 (Supp. 1972).
12. Id. § 2.08.060.
13. Id. § 2.08.150.
14. Id. § 20.08.090.
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tions of 5,000 to 20,000 people the judges work part-time, receive an
annual salary from $2,400 to $3,600, and may practice law as well.
In cities of 20,000 population and over, the judges are full-time and
receive $18,000 per annum. All salaries are paid from fees and fines
collected in cases decided by the judges or justices. The district judges,
the justices of the peace and the municipal judges are all elected for
four-year terms. In all of the courts of limited jurisdiction an appeal
lies to the superior court where, if the appeal is perfected, the case
is tried de novo.
I.

SHORTCOMINGS OF THE WASHINGTON COURT
SYSTEM

The most serious flaw in the court structure is its total lack of any
line of managerial authority, which causes each court to act as a separate entity without any central administrative control. The courts
should be unified into a single system with administrative control in
the chief justice, the Administrator or the supreme court. The court
system should have one budget statewide, with all fines, forfeitures
and the like paid into the state treasury. A statewide budget would facilitate determination of the full cost of the court system, which presently is unknown because of thd system's atomization. There should
be one trial court of general jurisdiction-the superior court-and all
of the courts of limited jurisdiction should be merged into it as divisions of the superior court. All appeals from courts of limited jurisdiction should be on the record and not de novo.
The Administrator should be subordinate to the chief justice, who
should have the ultimate administrative power over the entire court
system. Functioning as the right arm of the chief justice, the Administrator would nominally be the manager of the system. To afford a
more continuous administrative policy, the chief justice should be selected for at least five years, preferably serving in this capacity for his
full term. All of the administrative and clerical assistants should be
selected by the Administrator. Continuing programs of education
should be organized for all personnel, including the judges.
Judges should, of course, be selected on a merit plan that would
remove them from politics. The merit plan presently used in an increasing number of states employs a commission composed of laymen,
lawyers and judges selected on a nonpartisan basis. The commission
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usually nominates three persons for each vacancy in the court system,
and the governor appoints one of the three nominated. All judges
in the state should be included in the merit plan; limiting merit
selection to appellate judges is untenable. Indeed, since trial judges
are more exposed to political pressure than appellate judges, in
my view it is more important to select trial judges under a merit
plan than it is to select appellate judges in this manner. Once
appointed and qualified, the judge should never be required to
thereafter run for his office on a political basis. Instead, at stated
periods his name should be on a retention ballot allowing the
voters to pass on the sole question of whether he should be retained on
the bench. In this time of high cost campaigns, judges should not have
to conduct political campaigns for their positions on the bench.
Coupled with the merit selection plan, a disciplinary procedure similar to California's' 5 should be adopted to permit the disciplining or
removal of a judge for cause without necessity of maintaining an impeachment prosecution. Such a procedure serves somewhat as an
ombudsman, providing a check and balance to the tenure granted the
judge under the merit selection plan. The procedure is informal and
has proven highly successful.
Finally, no judge should be permitted to practice law while serving
on the bench. This degrades the judicial process and is one of the
chief reasons for public discontent with the judges.
It is only through efficient operation of the judicial system that we
can eliminate presently existing injustices which constitute a basic
cause of dissatisfaction with the judiciary. All of our people are entitled to equal justice under law. We hear much about maintaining order, but before we can attain it we must listen and respond to pleas for
justice. History teaches that we will have neither order nor justice
until we attain both.

15. See CAL. CIv. & CRIM. CT. R. 901-921 (West Supp. 1972) for the rules governing
censure, removal or retirement ofjudges in California.
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